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Petitioner Desert Power, L.P. ("Desert Power"), through its counsel of record,
submits this Reply Brief in Support of its Petition for Review.
ARGUMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Before this Court for review is the Public Service Commission of Utah's
("PSC") misinterpretation of the force majeure provision of the Power Purchase
Agreement ("PPA") between PacifiCorp and Desert Power.1 The facts critical to making
that determination are undisputed, leaving only a question of law for this Court to
consider.
In their Response Brief, the PSC and PacifiCorp argue that Desert Power failed to
preserve any questions of facts, but under the circumstances of this case, that is neither
necessary nor possible. The only findings the PSC and PacifiCorp could muster on force
majeure from the PSC's September 20, 2006 Order are three conclusory statements by
the PSC. (Response Brief at pp. 12-13.) As to the first two, which are actually a single
conclusion that the parties jointly had difficulty timely meeting milestones, whatever the
merits of the conclusion, the simple fact is that the record demonstrates that prior to
October 20, 2005, (and not even then), no one at PacifiCorp ever suggested to Desert
Power that the interconnection modifications could not be completed within a timeframe

1

Although the PSC and PacifiCorp appear to raise an issue as to whether the force
majeure issue was before the PSC (Response Brief at p. 10), it is clear from the record
{e.g., R-145 September Tr. at pp. 9-10) as well as the PSC Order itself that the matter was
fully before it and considered and decided by it.
1

consistent with the requirements of the PPA for Desert Power's expanded plant to be
online.
The third claimed finding is what the PSC and PacifiCorp call an "implicit"
finding putatively contained in the conclusory statement in the Order that ".. .that none of
the matters Desert Power complains of are force majeure events."

(R-117 at p.6.)

However, the "implicit" finding demonstrates that the claimed findings, in fact, are
totally inadequate. If anything, the "implicit" finding supports Desert Power's position
that this case only presents a question of law. As shown by the conclusory statement that
putatively contains the "implicit" finding, in rejecting Desert Power's claim that a force
majeure event had occurred, the PSC accepted as undisputed the matters of which Desert
Power complained. Desert Power complained that PacifiCorp's unilateral redesign of its
interconnection with Desert Power and the resultant delays, notwithstanding Desert
Power's diligent efforts to overcome the delays, constituted an event of force majeure.
The only question then is whether these events triggered the force majeure provisions of
the PPA, and that involves the legal conectness of what the PSC did, not the resolution of
disputed facts. Without expertise or experience with force majeure, the PSC's decision is
due no deference by this Court and should be reversed.
II.

THE RELEVANT FACTS TO FORCE MAJEURE ARE LIMITED AND
UNDISPUTED
A. Desert Power's Statement of Facts Focuses on Facts Relevant to the
Issue Presented for Review
Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a

Petitioner's brief include w;a statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for

2

review...." The only issue Desert Power presents for review in its brief is the PSC's
misinterpretation of Section 13, the force majeure provision of Desert Power's Power
Purchase Agreement ("PPA") with PacifiCorp.
Unlike the PSC and PacifiCorp's statement of facts in their Response Brief, Desert
Power's statement focuses solely on the points that are material, relevant, and critical to
determining whether an event of force majeure occurred pursuant to the terms of PPA.
Those facts are as follows: 1) the PPA between PacifiCorp and Desert Power has a force
majeure provision, the sole subject of Section 13 of the PPA (R-48); 2) from February
2005 to October 2005, PacifiCorp and Desert Power used the original substation and
interconnection design in planning the interconnection of the expanded Desert Power
plant to the PacifiCorp transmission system (See e.g., R-82 Swenson testimony at pp. 3-6,
R-145 September Tr. at pp. 14, 124-125); 3) on October 19, 2005, PacifiCorp unilaterally
changed the design of the interconnection (See e.g., R-82 Swenson testimony at p. 4; R84); 4) the new interconnection redesign meant that the timeline for equipment
acquisition, including long-lead time items, would be significantly extended (See e.g., R145 September Tr. at pp. 14-16, 237-239); 5) without the change in design and long-lead
times, Desert Power would have been able to achieve commercial operation within the
time allowed under the PPA (See e.g., R-145 September Tr. at pp. 15, 41-42, 44-47, 152154); 6) Desert Power sought to mitigate the impact of the redesign by undertaking, at its
own risk, to order those long lead-time items even though that was not its responsibility
under the PPA, but Desert Power still could not mitigate the resulting adverse impact on
the schedule, which was worsened by PacifiCorp's delay in issuing the interconnection

3

study (See e.g., R-145 September Tr. at pp. 15-16, 150-153, R-82 Swenson testimony at
pp. 5-6, R-86); and 7) the change in design and resulting long-lead times were beyond the
control of Desert Power and which PacifiCorp was powerless to remedy notwithstanding
its efforts (See e.g., R-145 September Tr. pp. 14-15, 247-248).
These facts are all set out in the record of this case and are undisputed. And it is
these undisputed facts that demonstrate that under the unambiguous terms of Section 13
of the PPA, there was an event fully constituting a force majeure event.
B. Respondent Public Service Commission ("PSC") and PacifiCorp Raise
Several Issues in Their Response Brief that are Either
Mischaracterized as Disputed, Irrelevant to the Issue of Force
Majeure, False, or Attempt to Diffuse the Focus of this Case
The PSC and PacifiCorp raise numerous issues as alleged facts in their
Response Brief that are mischaracterized as disputed, give false impressions, and are not
relevant to whether or not PacifiCorp's change in design and the resultant long-lead times
for equipment required for the new design were an event of force majeure. On pages 32
through 35 the PSC and PacifiCorp enumerate four facts they claim are disputed which
include: 1) alleged delays attributed to Desert Power in seeking interconnection with
PacifiCorp; 2) the timing of Desert Power's acquisition of a steam turbine and generator
set (CwSTG"); 3) the alleged "requirement" of firm gas transportation for the Desert Power
plant; and, 4) Desert Power's requirement to execute a steam contract with a steam host.
As shown below, these facts are not germane to the issue offeree majeure in this case.
When Desert Power requested interconnection is uncontested. When Desert
Power acquired the STG is uncontested as well, but that date was long after Desert

4

Power's request for interconnection, which included the specifications for the STG
ultimately acquired." However, the central and dispositive fact is that until the change in
the interconnection design, there is absolutely no contention that PacifiCorp ever
informed Desert Power that it could not meet the in-service date/ Thus, the interposition
of the assertions is not germane to the issue of whether a force majeure event occurred
under the terms of the PPA. The fact is that Desert Power was on schedule to complete
the plant expansion within the scope of the PPA had PacifiCorp not changed the
interconnection design in October 2005. Any other action that could have been done
before the change in design is speculative and irrelevant.
In addition, PacifiCorp's claim of delay between January 2004 when Desert
Power filed its petition for PSC approval of a PPA and June 2004 when PPA negotiations
between Desert Power and PacifiCorp began is disingenuous. (Response Brief at p. 32.)
Desert Power had filed with the PSC a PPA it was prepared to sign when it sought
pricing for a qualifying facility ("QF") in January 2004.

There simply were no

negotiations until after the PSC set the pricing for QFs.
2

In its opening brief (pp. 7-8) Desert Power describes its five-month effort to acquire the
correct STG. The search had nothing to do with lack of financing as the PSC and
PacifiCorp claim (Response Brief at pp. 33-34); it was just difficult to find the generator
set with the necessary specifications. Indeed, the specifications for the proposed steam
turbine and generator set, and the fees charged by PacifiCorp for undertaking the
interconnection process, were provided to PacifiCorp long before Desert Power had its
financing.
3

Indeed, when Desert Power first contacted PacifiCorp's transmission group about the
proposed expansion in June 2004 with a proposed in-service date in January of 2006,
they expressed appreciation for the ''head's up" so early because they normally did not
have such a long advance notice. (R-145 September Tr. at p. 12.)

i

But that is all a sideshow designed to divert attention from the central fact here:
until the change in interconnection design, all parties were working toward a timely
completion and start-up of the Desert Power facility within the timeframe of the PPA,
and the PSC and PacifiCorp make no contention to the contrary.
The third claim the PSC and PacifiCorp make is that Desert Power had to have
firm gas transportation for its gas supply. (Response Brief at p. 34.) One must assume for the point is never specified in the Response Brief - that their contention is that
without such transportation, the PPA terms would not have been met. This claim is false.
Bruce Griswold, a PacifiCorp witness, admitted under cross examination that the PPA
does not require firm transportation. (R-145 September Tr. pp. 180-81.) The PPA only
requires that Desert Power make ^commercial [sic] reasonable" efforts to obtain the gas
necessary to operate the plant and deliver power to PacifiCorp. (R-48 Section 7 at p. 16.)
Desert Power had executed a gas supply agreement with IGI Resources and a
transportation agreement with Questar as Company. Thus, it had its gas requirements
already in place. (R-150 Darling testimony proprietary Ex. 1.10.)4
The fourth and final point the PSC and PacifiCorp raise in their Response Brief is
that at the time of the hearing, Desert Power did not have a steam contract in place to sell
the steam from its plant as required for QFs like Desert Power's. (Response Brief at p.
35.) Desert Power had a final draft ready for execution with US Magnesium. However,
an executed steam contract would have had no impact on PacifiCorp's decision to change
4

If Desert Power could not provide power when PacifiCorp dispatched the plant, the
damage provisions in the PPA would then take effect to keep PacifiCorp and its
customers whole.
6

the interconnection design. Neither would it have shortened any of the resulting
equipment delays resulting from the interconnection redesign effected by PacifiCorp.
Nor do the PSC and PacifiCorp contend to the contrary on either point. Rather, it is just
one more irrelevant fact interposed to divert attention from the controlling, undisputed
facts in this case: that the interconnection redesign constituted a force majeure event
under the PPA because its occurrence prevented the plant from being physically
completed and ready for operations within the time allowed under the PPA.
III.

THE FORCE MAJEURE PROVISION OF THE PPA IS NOT
AMBIGUOUS, NO ONE RAISED THAT ISSUE BEFORE THE PSC, AND
IT CANNOT NOW BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
A. Section 13 of the PPA, the Force Majeure Provision, Is Not Ambiguous
As Desert Power stated in its opening brief, Section 13 of the PPA is clear and

unambiguous: "As used in this Agreement, 'Force Majeure' or 'an event of Force
Majeure' means any cause beyond the reasonable control of the Seller or of PacifiCorp
that, despite the exercise of due diligence, such party is unable to prevent or overcome."
The examples in the list that follow thereafter are just that, examples, and the list is not
limited by the events specifically enumerated, as Section 13.5 pointedly demonstrates.
PacifiCorp's unilateral redesign of the interconnection and the consequent delays
in obtaining the new equipment required by the change meet the definition of an event of
force majeure under the PPA. In its opening brief, Desert Power cited Section 13.5
which shows that both parties to the PPA explicitly considered delays caused by longlead times and the unavailability of parts to be events of force majeure (p. 12). That is a
clear and important example in the PPA that the PSC and PacifiCorp noticeably ignored

1

in their brief even though it has direct application to this case. Desert Power's reliance
on Section 13.5 also shows that, the claims of the PSC and PacifiCorp to the contrary
notwithstanding, Desert Power relied on provisions of Section 13 other than Section 13.1
to establish that it encountered an event of force majeure. (Response Brief at p. 27.)
While Section 13.1 sets out the definition offeree majeure, the entire Section 13 is the
force majeure provision of the PPA.
Rather than deal with Section 13 5, the PSC and PacifiCorp strain to come up with
alternative interpretations of other subsections of Section 13 in support of their position,
which are completely implausible. They claim, for example, that it would make no sense
for a party who caused an event of force majeure to be excused from performance under
Section 13.2. (Response Brief at pp. 28-29.) That section only excuses a party "...from
whatever performance is affected by the event of Force Majeure," not from performance
that is not affected by the event of force majeure. If the delays caused by the long-lead
times for equipment required by the new design affected any part of PacifiCorp's
performance, they would be relieved until the equipment arrived. That is not difficult to
understand. How it follows from that that a party who caused the force majeure event
would escape the obligations that arose before the event is incomprehensible. (Response
Brief at p. 29.) Section 13.3 makes inescapable any earlier obligations no matter the
cause of the event offeree majeure, and there is no other way to read that section. The
PSC and PacifiCorp's interpretation mischaracterizes Sections 13.2 and 13.3; such
misinterpretation should, therefore, be disregarded by this Court.

8

In addition, the PSC and PacifiCorp's strained and incorrect interpretation does
not somehow make the plain language of the PPA ambiguous. Watson v. Hatch, 728
P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1986), ('The language of the contract is plain and is not rendered
ambiguous by the fact that the parties urge different interpretations of it.") See also
yalentine v. Farmers Insurance, 141 P.3d 618, 621 (Utah App. 2006). There is no
ambiguity in Section 13 of the PPA, so the plain meaning of the unambiguous language
controls, and that language should be interpreted as a matter of law.

Webbank v.

American Annuity Service Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1145 (Utah 2002).
B. The Issue of Whether the PPA is Ambiguous Was Never Raised Before the
PSC and May Not be Raised for the First Time on Appeal
For the first time on appeal, the PSC and PacifiCorp raise a claim effectively that
the force majeure provisions may be ambiguous and this Court, sua sponte, should
undertake an examination of whether the force majeure provisions should be deemed
ambiguous. They then claim that Desert Power failed to preserve any of its ability to
argue factual issues if the Court, sua sponte, determines that the contract is ambiguous.
Notably, for all the argument, the PSC and PacifiCorp never claim that the clause is, in
fact, ambiguous.5

Rather, they only suggest that this Court on its own sua sponte

examination might find it so.

5

The nearest that the PSC and PacifiCorp can come to an assertion that an ambiguity may
exist is the statement contained at pp. 29-30 of their Response Brief that: "[a]t best, the
singular use of 'party' in section 13.1 raises an ambiguity." The use of the words "at
best" demonstrates that the claim constitutes a stretch even for the PSC and PacifiCorp.
More importantly, it is clear from the next sentence that PSC and PacifiCorp are not
themselves making the argument but are simply arguing that Desert Power is precluded
from making such an argument.
9

For the Court to do that at this stage would be overwhelmingly prejudicial to
Desert Power. If a provision of a contract is ambiguous, the Court would have to review
extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. IdL No such evidence was
adduced in the proceeding before the PSC because there was no claim of ambiguity. It is
not clear how the Court would proceed now. That is why an assertion that a contract
provision is ambiguous should be raised before the trier of fact.
In addition, in Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208, 1219 (Utah 2004), the
Utah Supreme Court stated: "[A]s a general rule we decline to address issues raised for
the first time on appeal." If the issue is not raised in the proceeding below, it is not
preserved for appeal. Id. No one asserted that Section 13 of the PPA was ambiguous,
nor did the PSC in its Order even raise the issue.

Indeed, one can search the entire

record without finding the words ambiguous, ambiguity, or vague even once mentioned,
including in the pre-filed testimony of PacifiCorp's three witnesses. PacifiCorp did not
preserve the issue for appeal in a petition to the PSC for reconsideration. How Desert
Power could have raised, as a hypothetical issue, the ambiguity of the force majeure
provisions when it believed they were unambiguous, no one had contended to the
contrary, and the PSC never claimed in its Order that the provisions were ambiguous is
never explained by the PSC and PacifiCorp.6 (Response Brief at p. 25 claiming waiver of
argument on ambiguity.)

6

Indeed, the only claim as to ambiguity interposed by the PSC and PacifiCorp is
tautological: they claim if this Court should determine that the unambiguous language of
the provision does not support the PSC's Order then in that event, "the contract is at least
10

C.

The PSC's and PacifiCorp's Improper Attempt to Raise Ambiguity
Does Not Create a Question of Fact
In addition to their improper attempt to raise the issue of ambiguity for the

first time on appeal, PacifiCorp and the PSC tried to use the possibility of ambiguity of
the force majeure provision of the PPA to claim that a question of fact exists.
However, in the event the Court were to find the force majeure provision to
be ambiguous, a question of fact would be raised regarding the proper
interpretation of the contract... As argued below, the PPA unambiguously
supports the Commission's interpretation. However, if not unambiguously
in support of the Commission's interpretation, the contract is at least
ambiguous.
(See Response Brief at pp. 24-25)
PacifiCorp and the PSC cannot bootstrap a question of fact into this case with an issue
not preserved for appeal and, therefore, not properly before this Court. Desert Power
recited undisputed facts in its opening brief and in this brief in support of the intended
interpretation of the force majeure provision of the PPA. There is no basis, legal or
factual, for this argument, and the Court should reject it.
IV.

THE PSC'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PPA PRESENTS A
QUESTION OF LAW FOR WHICH THIS COURT GIVES NO
DEFERENCE FOR THE PSC'S DECISION

A. Undisputed Facts Applied to an Unambiguous Contract Presents a
Question of Law for the Court to Review

ambiguous" and Desert Power, having failed to assert issues of fact, must lose on appeal.
The bottom line for the PSC and PacifiCorp is that the language is unambiguous unless it
does not support the PSC's Order, in which case the provision must be deemed
ambiguous and the PSC's Order sustained. Of course, the PSC and PacifiCorp proffer no
basis for construing the language as ambiguous other than their uheads I win, tails you
lose" approach to seeking an affirmance of the PSC's Order. This attempt to eviscerate
this Court's review should be summarily rejected.
11

On appeal, the standard of review for decisions in which administrative agencies
interpret contracts is correctness, and the reviewing court gives little or no deference to
the agency's decision. Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 148
P.3d 960, 965 (Utah 2006).

As demonstrated above, Section 13 of the PPA is

unambiguous and the critical facts in determining whether PacifiCorp's change in Desert
Power's interconnection design and the consequent delays are undisputed. There are no
questions of fact for the Court to review.
B. The PSC Has No Experience or Expertise to Interpret the PPA or to
Decide the Legal Principle of Force Majeure
Even if this Court were to determine that the correct standard of review were that
required for a mixed question of law and fact, it would give the PSC's decision little to no
deference. First, as noted several times before, interpreting a contract presents only a
question of law. Webbank v. American Annuity Service Corp., Supra. Second, on the
question of force majeure, the PSC has no expertise or experience with this legal
principle and is not in a better position than this Court to assess the law or to determine
whether the events that Desert Power encountered were events offeree majeure under the
PPA. Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, Supra.
In the two cases on which the PSC and PacifiCorp relied to argue that substantial
evidence and reasonableness are the appropriate standard for review of their claimed fact
components of this proceeding, the PSC's experience, expertise and position were the
very considerations the Utah Supreme Court gave for deferring to the agency's decision.
In Westside Dixon Associates LLC v. Utah Power & Light Company, 44 P.3d 775, 778

12

(Utah 2002), the Court said, "These issues are governed by reasonableness standard, in
view of the fact that the Commission, 'by virtue of its experience or expertise, is in a
better position than the courts to give effect to the regulatory objective to be achieved.'"
(Citation omitted.) In distinguishing the reasonableness standard from the correction-oferror standard in WWC Holding Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 44 P.3d 714,
718 (Utah 2002), the Court stated that the correction-of-error standard "...is especially
appropriate where the agency possesses no special expertise which would place it in a
better position than the court to decide the issue." (Citation omitted.) The PSC has no
special expertise or experience with force majeure and its decision should not establish
the legal principle of force majeure or determine how a force majeure contract clause
operates in the state of Utah.
C. The Decision of an Administrative Agency Deciding a Legal Principle is a
Question of Law
In deciding the standard of review for a decision of an administrative agency on
tfye legal doctrine of standing in Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality
Board, 148 P.3d 960, 966 (Utah 2006), the Utah Supreme Court differentiated between
decisions of a trial court and decisions of an administrative agency. The Court stated:
However, the Board's status as an administrative agency rather than a lower
court does influence our classification of standing as a question of law in
this case. In the non-administrative law context, standing would generally
be considered a "mixed question" because it involves the application of a
legal standard to a particularized set of facts. For example, when reviewing
a lower court's standing determination we have stated that "the question of
whether a given individual or association has standing to request a
particular relief is primarily a question of law, although there may be
factual findings that bear on the issue." Kearns-Tribune Corp. v.
Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372,373 (Utah 1997).
Nevertheless, in the

13

administrative law context, standing is a "general question of law" because
it is a judicial doctrine. As a court, we are in a better position than an
agency to determine whether this doctrine has been properly interpreted and
applied, just as we are in a better position to review questions of
constitutional and statutory interpretation.
The Court also gave no deference to the agency's decision "...because standing is
not within the Board's area of expertise.

That the Board has been assigned some

adjudicative functions does not implicitly give it any particular authority to interpret
standing doctrine or other issues of general statutory, constitutional, or common law." Id.
Likewise, this Court should give no deference to a PSC decision on force majeure when
that agency has no experience with or special expertise for making that decision.
D. The PSC's and PacifiCorp's Argument that Desert Power's Petition for
Review Requires that the Evidence Must be Marshaled is Wrong
As stated several times before, Desert Power's petition in this case is for review of
the PSC's misinterpretation of the PPA and presents only a question of law. As an
administrative agency, an appellate court gives the PSC's decision on a legal principle
like force majeure no deference, particularly when the agency has no expertise or
experience with the legal principle. Finally, undisputed facts applied to an unambiguous
contract leaves only a question of law for this Court to decide.
Even if the PSC's and PacifiCorp's argument that Desert Power must challenge
findings and marshal evidence were to have merit, either there were no decipherable
findings, or they were unclear, inadequate, and conclusory based on an errant
interpretation of the PPA and, therefore, reviewable as a matter of law. Even the PSC's
and PacifiCorp's Response Brief refers to the PSC's findings as conclusions.

14

(See

Response Brief pp. 12, 'The Commission's conclusions on force majeure, however, were
not revisited in later orders.") In its September 20, 2006 Order the PSC concluded as
follows on the issue of force majeure:
PacifiCorp and the Division argue that whatever difficulties have occurred
in efforts to bring the QF online, they are not force majeure events as
that term is used in the PPA. These parties argue that the delays and
difficulties that have been experienced result from the decisions and
actions PacifiCorp and Desert Power themselves made in the course of
their efforts to develop the QF, not from an outside source beyond the
control of Desert Power or PacifiCorp. PacifiCorp argues that Desert
Power's position is essentially attempting to vet what could be viewed as a
breach of contract as a force majeure. PacifiCorp further argues that
Desert Power's position is far too broad, elevating any difficulty a party
may have to be a force majeure event. Relative to PacifiCorp's conduct
and actions, Desert Power's witnesses concede that they are in no violation
of any contractual, statutory or tariff term or standard. We agree with the
positions of PacifiCorp and the Division that none of the matters Desert
Power complains of are force majeure events.
September 20, 2006 Order pp. 5-6 (emphasis added). It is clear from this statement that
the PSC's conclusions were based on a narrow, incorrect interpretation of the contract.
There are no clear factual determinations, however, from which to determine how the
PSC reached its conclusions, making a challenge by Desert Power difficult if not
impossible.
The only clear statement in all of this is "... that none of the matters Desert Power
complains of are force majeure events." Thus, even after taking the assertions of Desert
Power as true, the PSC concluded there was no triggering of the force majeure clause of
the PPA. As previously set out, however, taking all those allegations as true, there was a
clear triggering of the express provisions of the force majeure clause, and the PSC was in
error to conclude otherwise.
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In Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378
(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court said that with respect to findings:
The Commission cannot discharge its statutory responsibilities without
making findings of fact on all necessary ultimate issues under the
governing statutory standards. It is also essential that the Commission make
subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the critical subordinate factual
issues are highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as to demonstrate that
there is a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. The
importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings of fact is
essential to a proper determination by an administrative agency. To that
end, findings should be sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are
reached. See generally, Rucker v Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah
1979). Without such findings, this Court cannot perform its duty of
reviewing the Commission's order in accordance with established legal
principles and of protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and
capricious administrative action.
The Court criticized the PSC again for having poor or no findings in MCI v.
Public Service Commission, 840 P.2d 765 (Utah 1992) emphasizing that every rate
adjustment must be predicated on a finding that the adjustment is just and reasonable, and
"[i]n turn, this finding must be supported by substantial evidence concerning every
significant element in rate making components (expense or investment) which is
claimed by the applicant as the basis to justify a rate adjustment." Id. at 773 (emphasis
added). Of significance is that in MCI, the Court cited Milne approvingly and reiterated
that if the PSC did not make findings on every ultimate and subordinate issue of fact, the
Court could not properly review the decision. IcL at 774. Apart from the significance of
the requirement for clear findings itself, the Court decided MCI after Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(4)(g) was in effect which established the standard of review when an agency
makes determinations of fact. It would be this section on which the PSC and PacifiCorp

16

relied to claim that the PSC's conclusory findings, including the implicit finding, meet
the Court's requirement that the PSC make findings on every ultimate and subordinate
issue of fact. The findings simply are not adequate for this Court to do a proper review.
Id. What is clear is that the PSC relied on the undisputed facts of which Desert Power
complained to determine there was no event of force majeure, which leaves this Court
with only a question of law to decide.
After Desert Power filed its opening brief in this proceeding, the Utah Supreme
Court issued Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints. — P.3d ~ , 2007 WL 1452840, 2007 UT 42, Utah, May 18, 2007, reversing and
remanding this Court's decision on the issue of the appropriate standard of review for
factual determinations of the Labor Commission of Utah. The case involved a petition
for permanent total disability filed at the Labor Commission.

The Supreme Court

reversed this Court's review of the Labor Commission's findings that was based on abuse
of discretion on grounds that the appropriate standard was a substantial evidence
standard. Id. at ^} 10, 38-39. The Court said that this Court "... improperly reweighed
the Commission's factual determinations under the guise of reviewing the application of
facts to law." Id.

7

Desert Power acknowledges that § 63-46b-16(4)(g) refers to "... a determination of fact,
made or implied by an agency...", but if conclusory statements strewn through an order
and implicit findings inferred from conclusory statements meet the standard, then there is
no standard. Any judicial review of such a standard would be subjective and
unpredictable, and any challenge by a party would be an exercise in futility. Since Desert
Power's challenge presents only a question of law, however, this Court does not face this
issue.
17

Martinez is distinguishable from this case, however, because the Labor
Commission was addressing a subject specifically entrusted to it by the legislature. The
petition for permanent total disability was squarely within the Labor Commission's
jurisdiction. Under that circumstance, assuming the findings were otherwise adequate,
the Supreme Court held that an appellate court should defer to the Commission's findings
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g); the Commission has expertise in and
experience with the subject area and is therefore in a better position to make the
determinations of fact.
That is not true in this case. The PSC's interpretation of the PPA presents only a
question of law for which there is no deference and it has no experience with or expertise
in determining what events constitute an event of force majeure.

On that basis, the

Martinez case is inapplicable.
The Martinez case made other important points that could have some bearing on
the PSC's and PacifiCorp's arguments in their Response Brief. First, the Court made
clear that when an agency's findings of fact are so inadequate that they cannot be
meaningfully challenged as factual determinations, marshaling of evidence is not
required. Id at ^f 13. As Desert Power has shown, the PSC's findings are irredeemably
inadequate and as a result, unchallengeable. Second, the marshaling requirement is not a
substantive rule of law and does not limit the discretion of the appellate court to review
the record. Id. at Tflj 19, 20. It is only a tool for the Court and not marshaling the
evidence is not automatically fatal to an appeal as the PSC and PacifiCorp argue. Third,
and finally, once again on the issue of deferring to an agency decision the Court stated:
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c

^Our conclusion is also consistent with the principle that grants of discretion to

administrative agencies should be limited to those issues on which the agencies have
"special experience or expertise placing [them] in a better position than the courts to
construe the law." [Citation omitted.] Id. at Tf 45. There simply is no basis on which to
defer to the PSC's decision on the PPA or the issue of force majeure with which it has no
experience or expertise.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The dispositive facts relevant to resolving whether there has been a force majeure
event under the unambiguous terms of Section 13 of the PPA are unchallenged. The
PSC's Order itself accepts that those facts, as asserted by Desert Power, can be examined
as unchallenged for purposes of determining whether the force majeure provisions of the
PPA have been properly invoked. An examination of the unambiguous terms of Section
13 demonstrates that Desert Power properly invoked the force majeure provisions.
Accordingly the PSC's Order should be reversed, and this Court should enter an
order and judgment finding that a force majeure event occurred as a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of June, 2007.
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